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THE FAILURE OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST LAW
The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken once
more on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and the community is
again ordered to revise its opinion on that subject. Recently, that
court rendered two decisions in which it was decided that the
plan or scheme adopted by the Cement ' and Maple Flooring As-
sociations 2 was intended merely as a means of disseminating
information and knowledge to those engaged in those two indus-
tries, and not as a means of evading the Sherman Law. On Octo-
ber 12, 1925, the Supreme Court denied the Government's appli-
cation for a rehearing of these cases.
The casual student of the Anti-Trust Law may regard the
decisions as harmless for the Supreme Court declared in its opin-
ion that the decision for the defense was based solely on the Gov-
ernment's failure to state and prove a case. But those who have
been charged with the administration of the Sherman Law and
who are acquainted with the practices of trade associations feel
confident that these two decisions of the Supreme Court will result
in a revival of the illegal practices with which the community had
been afflicted.
The facts in the Maple Flooring case and in the Cement case
are more or less identical. They represent a new species of price-
fixing agreement: a hybrid of the price-fixing agreement and of
the Eddy Open Price Plan.
I
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRICE REGULATION BY
COMBINATION AGREEMENTS
"Price fixing," when used in connection with combination
agreements, denotes the control of a substantial part of an indus-
try by a combination which has destroyed the normal functioning
of the law of supply and demand. It does not necessarily mean
the fixation of uniform sale prices by the members of the com-
' Cement Manufacturers' Protective Assn., et a., v. U. S., 268 U. S. 593
(1924).
'Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn., et at., v. U. S., 268 U. S. 563 (1924).
(122)
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bination; on the contrary, such an agreement in recent years is
rare.
Price regulation in industry has undergone various changes
during the last thirty-five years. The first task of such combina-
tions was to circumvent the Sherman, Law; the second task, to
counteract the effect of a depression in the market resulting in re-
duced prices.
(A) An Early Form of Price-Fixing Arrangement
In its elementary stage, and in its crudest form, price-fixing
was an operation engaged in by the leaders of an industry who
controlled from about thirty to sixty per cent. of a commodity.
Since production was not limited to the probable demand for the
commodity at the fixed price, the law of supply and demand
worked havoc with those price-fixing agreements. Therefore, in
the early nineties experience gave to these combinations their first
lesson in economics. They learned that a manufacturer cannot
keep hoarding his wares forever; that there is a limit to his endur-
ance. They found that when production leaps far beyond demand,
economic law establishes the sale prices of the commodity in the
market, combination agreements to the contrary notwithstanding.
This type of agreement had another inherent weakness. The
combinations were comprised of the leaders in the industry. The
small manufacturer was completely disregarded. The combina-
tions found as time went on that these small manufacturers gave
severe combat; they unconsciously hindered the proper execution
of the combinations' agreement. Interest on the capital invest-
ment and the cost of overhead in a small business constitute an
almost negligible item in figuring the cost of production. By un-
derselling their leading competitors, the small manufacturers kept
increasing the size of their business.
The great combinations, thereupon, were compelled to devise
a scheme to entice the small manufacturers. They recognized that
it would be idle to ask a small manufacturer to join the combina-
tion and to charge the fixed price, for with equality of price, the
retailer would rather deal with the established house. The idea
was conceived of giving these small manufacturers an advantage.
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The members were divided into various classes, the leaders agree-
ing to charge the fixed price, and those in the remaining classes
being permitted to charge two, five and in some instances fifteen
per cent. less than fixed price.
The combination is a very powerful institution in an indus-
try. Yet it by no means wields the power with which it is invested
in the mind of the small American business man. If it is pointed
out to him by the leaders of an industry that by joining the asso-
ciation his net profits may be enhanced though the size of his busi-
ness will remain stationary, it is seldom that he declines the invita-
tion to join the combination. The man with a small but profitable
business would generally prefer to develop it in his own way,
hopeful that in years to come he will be the leading figure in the.
industry. He recognizes that to join the combination means def-
erence to the leaders. It is difficult for him to agree to place
himself in a position where his own business policy ceases to be a
factor, and his business judgment divorced from the movements
in the industry. Fear that failure to join the combination woul
mean destruction, coupled with the knowledge that association
with it would mean even a much greater security than he enjoyed
theretofore, impel him to become a member of the combination.
An arrangement whereby production was limited, prices
fixed and in some instances particular territory allocated to the
various members was the customary combination agreement -n+;,
about 1919. Since then this type of agreement has also fallen
into discard and an improved arrangement has taken its place.
It is the purpose of all illegal trade combinations to charge
the highest possible price without unprofitably diminishing de-
mand. Combinations found during the war period that their
agreements were not sufficiently elastic to provide for the a.-
vantages in sales prices to be derived from an excellent sellers'
market.
(B) The Latest Form of Price-Fixing Agreement
The price-fixing agreement in its perfect form limits the
amount of production and fixes a minimum sale price. The smali
manufacturer generally charges the fixed minimum sale price.
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The others charge higher amounts, dependent upon the reputation
of their firm names. Again, in some industries, the firm name is
of more importance than in others. Of course, all members of
the combination try to get varying amounts in excess of the mini-
mum price.
It is obvious that for a space of time immediately after the
making of the agreement, there is an adjustment of prices by the
members of the combination. Some begin by asking prices lower
than those they could obtain in the market; others begin by ask-
ing prices that are so excessive that, before long, lack of orders
compels them to reduce their prices. It should be recognized
that in the absence of this minimum price fixation, the probabil-
ity is that these minimum prices would be the prevailing market
prices.
Most business men are not so adventurous that they will
agree on a minimum price; it is probable that such an agreement
would be held to be illegal. Therefore, the approach is entirely
different; they agree to have a joint cost accounting system.
Each member under the supervision of the association, deter-
mines the cost of the raw material that enters into each piece of
the commodity, the cost of production, the cost of overhead, de-
preciation, interest on investment, et cetera. In many corpora-
tions, excluding the gigantic corporate entities, the officers are the
sole stockholders or the majority stockholders of the corpora-
tion. Their salaries, which are usually set at an amount ex-
tremely in excess of the actual value of their services, are included
either in the cost of overhead or in the cost of production.
It is needless to say that the members fix their respective
costs of production at the highest possible amount; the general
public, which in a sense constitutes the adversary, is not repre-
sented and does not partake in the determination. The average
cost of production to the members is taken by the association as
the actual cost of production. Thereafter, at association meet-
ings or at other conferences of the members of the combination,
"the cost of production" will be referred to as though the amounts
had been determined by scientific methods, and as though it were
the same for all the members. Before long, the members attain
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the state of mind that this "cost of production" actually repre-
sents cost on which prices must be based.
To assist each other in determining the prices that can be
charged, the members circulate weekly, either personally or
through the association, the prices at which they made their sales.
These reports may inform one member that his prices are lower
than the others in his class and he naturally increases them; it
may tell another member that his prices are higher than the others
in is class and he will decrease his prices.
In order to keep production to the point where these prices
can be obtained, the members report weekly to the association the
amount of production on hand, and the extent of the orders re-
ceived. The secretary of the association collates this information
and immediately distributes it to the members. In that way pro-
duction is limited to the probable demand for the commodity at
the prices determined by the members of the combination.
There is one other aspect to the situation. Certain members
in almost all trade combinations are advantageously situated
geographically.3 To destroy this advantage and to put all mem-
bers on the same basis, freight rates are almost invariably equal-
ized. Sometimes, the combination agrees on one arbitrary point
and to the sale price is added the amount that the purchaser
would have paid for freight if he had bought the merchandise
from a seller at that arbitrary geographical point. Even if the
purchaser buys his merchandise from a member of the combina-
tion having a mill adjacent to the purchaser's place of business,
the purchaser, nevertheless, must pay this fictitious freight charge.
Within the writer's experience, he has never found a trade
combination that equalized freight rates that did not operate un-
der some form of price-fixing agreement. It may take the form
wherein the leader of the industry issues a price bulletin to his
customers and the other members of the combination follow those
prices in making sales to their customers, or price-fixing may be
operative as a result of an arrangement fixing base list prices with
* "It is obvious that no more powerful instrument of monopoly could lv used
than an advantage in the cost of transportation." Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S.
401, 402 (9o5).
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certain discounts to be invoked. Or price-fixing may exist as in
the perfect scheme by using a fictitious uniform cost accounting
system which in effect fixes minimum sales prices.
A few years ago the Department of Justice investigated a
combination which it had reason to believe violated the Sherman
Law. The most careful examination of the minutes of its meet-
ings, the correspondence between the association and its members
and the correspondence of the members failed to disclose evidence
of price-fixing. The fact remained, however, that the combina-
tion equalized freight rates: a circumstance usually indicative
of a price-fixing agreement.
Careful scrutiny disclosed the fact that there was a trade
journal in the industry. This publication issued by members of
the association contained surveys with regard to the future of
the industry and prices predicted by the editor for the ensuing
months. The predicted prices were the prices actually fixed by
the combination.
No valid reason can be asserted for the equalization of
freight rates except as a means of supporting and sustaining ar-
bitrary sale prices in the market. Scepticism of dogmatic declara-
tions may cause one to pause at the statement; experience, how-
ever, with combinations compels that conclusion.
II
THE DECISION IN THE MAPLE FLOORING CASE CONTRASTED
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS
It has already been indicated that the facts in the Cement and
Maple Flooring cases are practically alike. For purpose of brev-
ity, the discussion will be limited to the Maple Flooring combina-
tion.
In that case, the Government showed that the present scheme
was an outgrowth of a price arrangement which existed among
the defendants in which the defendants not only fixed the prices
of this commodity but ii addition allotted a percentage of the
aggregate shipments to the various members of the Association.
The Government also showed that a booklet had been issued by
the Secretary of this Association, wherein appeared the sale price
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of the commodity and the amount that would be added for freight.
In other words, under the old plan the defendants went so far as
to print the fixed net sale price to be charged by each member of
the Association.
In 1921 the Association received a letter from the Assistant
to the Attorney-General stating that the agreement constituted a
flagrant violation of the Sherman Law. 4 In addition to this re-
proval came active prosecution of the Sherman Law violations
during the years 1921-1923.
The defendants, thereupon abandoning their old plan, en-
tered into a so-called gentlemen's agreement, providing for the
distribution and dissemination of reports with reference to the
business of each and every member of this Association.5
The bill in equity filed by the Government 0 alleged in sub-
stance that the defendants by agreement fixed minimum prices
upon the commodity, and controlled its production and prices in
the market by the observance of provisions contained in the plan
of the Association, which provided for the computation and dis-
tribution among the membership of alleged average costs, being
in fact agreed minimum prices, for the adoption and distribution
of freight rate books, for an open price reporting.plan, and for
meetings of the members of the Association.
The Government also charged that the plan or scheme
adopted by these defendants had a direct and necessary tendency
to destroy competition, that the methods employed by them
tended at all times to impede the operation of the laws of supply
and demand, and that the effect was to stifle competition con-
trary to the intendment of the Sherman Law.
The Government proved that pursuant to this "gentlemen's
agreement," the members of this Association reported weekly to
the Secretary of the Association on printed forms, giving com-
plete data as to sales made by the reporting members; quantity,
thickness, face, grade and kind of wood; delivery, sales prices,
average freight rate to destination, and rate of commission paid.
'Trial Record, Vol. IV, p. 8o2.
'Trial Record, Vol. III, p. 7o.
'Trial Record, Vol. I, pp. 7-o.
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The members also reported the amount of flooring on hand of
each dimension and grade, and the amount of unfilled orders.
Monthly reports were also required showing the amount of pro-
duction for each period and the new orders booked for each vari-
ety of flooring. The Association promptly reported back to the
members statistics compiled from these reports and information
as to quantities, grades, prices and freight rates, with respect to
each sale.7
To realize the complete benefit of the old plan, the combina-
tion continued to equalize freight rates. Since the plants of the
members of this Association were located in five states: Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, with one plant in Illinois and another
as far east as New York, the charge for freight would be a vital
factor to the prospective purchaser in determining where to make
his purchase. To make the scheme complete, the defendants
agreed that the freight to be charged to the, purchaser should be
based arbitrarily on the freight charge from Cadillac, Michigan.8
At the trial one of the defendants, a member of the Market
Conditions Committee of the Association, testified as follows: 9
"A. The general market conditions were always dis-
cussed; yes.
Q. And the range of prices?
A. Sometimes."
"A. There is no question at all if I went to one of those
meetings, I went there to get information if I could as to
market conditions, and the reason I wanted that information
was to know what I would do with my prices; yes.
Q. That was the ultimate object you had in mind all
the time?
A. Absolutely.
Q. That is what you wanted all of this information
for?
A. Why, it would be useless to us for any other pur-
pose.
'Trial Record, Vol. III, p. 70.
'Trial Record, Vol. I, p. x1; Vol. IV, p. 433.
' Testimony of Witness Ralston, Trial Record, Vol. I, pp. 330-331.
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Q. And that is the reason all of you exchanged all this
information about yourselves, was it?
A. Yes, it was spoken of that way."
In the course of its argument before the Supreme Court, the
defense admitted that dissemination of this information as to the
cost of the product, and as to production and prices, would tend
to bring about a uniformity in prices.
Since the Supreme Court in these two decisions reaffirms the
doctrine that an agreement to fix prices is in contravention of the
Sherman Act, is it too much to have expected that it would brand
this agreement as one within the prohibitions of that law? Do
business men combine to install a joint cost accounting system,
pay the expense involved to carry on this scheme, and retain a
secretary and other experts for the correlation of this informa-
tion, if they do not intend to be guided by the information in
fixing their prices?
We would expect that the defendants' admission would have
been sufficient in and of itself to convince the Court that the in-
herent characteristics of this agreement placed it completely
within the category of a price-fixing arrangement.
It is inconceivable that the Highest Court of the Land would
seriously entertain the argument of the defense that a member
of this Association having his plant in New York and making a
sale in Colorado would be willing to pay the freight rates of a
heavy shipment from New York to Cadillac, Michigan, to save a
purchaser the trouble of ascertaining the freight rate from the
seller's place of business to the purchaser's place of business.
If the Supreme Court's decision is based on the insufficiency
of the Government's allegations, then the proper course for that
Court to have pursued was to deny the application on that ground.
While statements to that effect are set forth in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone who wrote for the majority, the fact remains that
the Supreme Court decided the case on its merits, and held the
plan to be completely innocuous.
It seems obvious when we comb the facts that this repre-
sented the modern type of price-fixing agreement. Sale price v a
not to be based in a competitive market on cost plus profit i
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* instead, on a fictitious average cost to the members of the com-
bination and a profit that could be exacted after production had
been manipulated and limited. Assuming, however, that it was
not an agreement whereby prices were actually fixed, the fact
does remain that the defendants entered into an agreement to
give to each other all the information with regard to their own
business so that they would all be enabled to have a basis for fix-
ing their individual prices. As the Government argued in its
brief "0 submitted to the Supreme Court, the very foundation of
competition consists of the difference in the cost of production
and of distribution. It is that difference which enables one com-
petitor to undersell another, and with its elimination competition
practically disappears.
It was the aim and purpose of the Sherman Law to protect
the public against any artificial means adopted either by combina-
tions of capital or of labor to thwart the functioning of the ordi-
nary economic laws."1 The creation of an artificial force which
places the power to control production and prices in the hands of
a combination cannot be said to foster competition.
It should not be overlooked that the mere agreement to im-
pede or stifle competition is a violation of the Sherman Law.
12
It was the opinion of the legislative authority that the public is
assured the greatest benefit by competitive enterprise.13 Experi-
0 Pages 61-62.
1 Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 438 (igio); Eastern
States Lumber Asso. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 6oo, 6o8, 618 (914) ; Thomsen v. Cay-
ser, 243 U. S. 66, 84, 85, 86 (1916) ; U. S. v. American Linseed Oil Co., et al.,
262 U. S. 371 (1Q22).
"'U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 166 U. S. 290, 323 (i896) ; Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 85 Fed. 271, 291 (1898); Affd. 175 U. S. 211
(i899); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 407 (i9o);
U. S. v. A. Schrader's Sons, 252 U. S. 85, ioo (1gig) ; Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co. v. U. S., 226 U. S. 20 (I9II); Swift & Co. v. U. S., supra, note 3.
"The great purpose of both (referring to Sherman and Clayton Acts) was
to advance the public interest by securing fair opportunity for the play of the
contending forces, ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain." Federal
Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 476 (1922).
"It has been suggested that we should have regard to new commercial
conditions and a tendency toward a relaxation of old common-law principles
which tend to prevent development on modern lines. This is an argument
better addressed to legislative bodies than to the courts. Neither is it wise
for the courts to countenance the introduction of artificial distinctions de-
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ence may have convinced that authority that Philip Spencers are
rarely found in trust combinations. Whereas, that body might
also have found that to create monopoly prices is the usual prac-
tice of such combinations.
The Court's findings of fact in the Maple Flooring case
that the sale prices of the defendants varied should not have af-
fected its decision. The prior decisions of that Court did not
condemn price-fixing merely because of symmetry of prices. It is
immaterial whether curtailment of production and the fixation
of prices constituted the agreement or whether the agreement
was to bring a foreign force into play so that supply and de-
mand no longer determined the sale price of the commodity. Any
device or simulation which is substituted for competitive enter-
prise equally denies to the public the benefits-to be derived from
the free movement of trade and commerce.
The situation is not altered by the Court's finding that prices
in this industry have receded to the same extent that they have in
other industries. There is no means of determining the sale
prices that would have obtained in this particular industry in the
absence of this artifical barrier. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
was without knowledge as to whether combination agreements
were not responsible for the sales prices that existed in those other
industries which it studied and examined.
pendent upon the variant economic views of individual judges. Distinctions
which are specious or analogies which are but apparent will but afford op-
portunities to whittle away broad economic principles lying at the bottom of
our public policy, principles which have long received the sanction of states-
men and the approving recognition of a long line of jurists. A like argu-
ment is expected whenever some new method of circumventing freedom of
commerce comes under the tests of the law. It was made and answered by
Judge Taft in the Addyston Pipe Case with a strength to which we can add
nothing."
The closing remarks of Circuit Judge (subsequently Mr. Justice) Lurton in
John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 46 (igo7):
"1 . . in view of the general language of the Statute and the public
policy which it manifested, there was no possibility of frustrating that policy
by resorting to any disguise or subterfuge of form, since resort to reason
rendered it impossible to escape by any indirection the prohibitions of the
statute." U. S. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 22i U. S. io6, i8i (IgIo).
See also: Swift & Co. v. U. S., supra, notes 3, 12; U. S. v. Reading Co.,
226 U. S. 324, 358 (1912) ; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S., supra, note
i2; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199 (914) ; Thomsen v.
Cayser, supra, note Ii.
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For the Supreme Court to declare, that this agreement is
legal because the power has not been exercised to the injury of
the public, repudiates all prior decisions of that Court. Thereto-
fore, that Court had declared in the boldest language that the
law is exerted against the sinister potential power that follows
the execution of such an agreement. 14
Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent in the Maple Flooring case
is entitled to very careful examination. 15
"These causes disclose carefully developed plans to cut
down normal competition in interstate trade and commerce.
Long impelled by this purpose, appellants have adopted vari-
ous expedients through which they evidently hoped to defeat
the policy of the law without subjecting themselves to pun-
ishment.
"They are parties to definite and unusual combinations
and agreements, whereby each is obligated to reveal to con-
federates the intimate details of his business and is restricted
in his freedom of action. It seems to me that ordinary
knowledge of human nature and of the impelling force of
greed ought to permit no serious doubt concerning the ulti-
mate outcome of the arrangements. We may confidently
expect that destruction of that kind of competition long re-
lied upon by the public for establishment of fair prices, and
to preserve which the Anti-Trust Act was passed ..
III
A PARADOX: THE DECISIONS REGARDING THE PERFECT
PRICE-FIXING ARRANGEMENT
In i919, the Department of Justice had a number of cases
under consideration in which combinations were operating un-
der the newly conceived price-fixing plan previously discussed.
There were at that time no Supreme Court decisions determin-
ing or discussing its legality.
In building up a record in a case before a court of first in-
stance, a government prosecutor may at times overlook an im-
IA Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. v. U. S., supra, note i2; U. S. v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., supra, note 12; Thomsen v. Cayser, supra, note ui; Swift v.
U. S., supra, notes 3, 12, 13; American Column & Lumber Co., v. U. S., 257
U. S. 377 (i92r), and U. S. v. American -Linseed Oil Co., supra, note Ii.
'268 U. S., at page 587.
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portant fact. Realizing that, it was the judgment of the Depart-
ment of Justice to proceed with its weakest case first. The first
case of this type presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States was the prosecution against the American Column and
Lumber combination, commonly referred to as the Hardwood
Lumber case."' In that case, the combination through its secre-
tary merely distributed prices charged by the members and quan-
tity of production on hand. There was no agreement to operate
under a fictitious cost accounting system. It was believed that if
the Supreme Court would decide that case in favor of the Gov-
ernment it would surely decide all the others in the same way.
After hearing argument and reargument in the Hardwood
Lumber case, the Supreme Court in 1921 rendered its decision.
It held that the Hardwood Association was a combination in re-
straint of trade. Justices Holmes, McKenna and Brandeis dis-
sented; Mr. Justice Clarke, speaking for the majority of the
Court, declared: 17
"The 'Plan' is, essentially, simply an expansion of the
gentlemen's agreement of former days, skillfully devised to
evade the law. To call it open competition because the
meetings were nominally open to the public, or because some
voluminous reports were transmitted to the Department of
Justice, or because no specific agreement to restrict trade or
fix prices is proved, cannot conceal the fact that the funda-
mental purpose of the 'Plan' was to procure 'harmonious'
individual action among a large number of naturally com-
peting dealers with respect to the volume of production and
prices, without having any specific agreement with respect
to them, and to rely for maintenance of concerted action in
both respects, not upon fines and forfeitures as in earlier
days, but upon what experience has shown to be the more
potent and dependable restraints of business honor and so-
cial penalties; cautiously reinforced by many and elabo-
rate reports, which would promptly expose to his associates
any disposition in any member to deviate from the tacit un-
derstanding that all were to act together under the subtle
American Column & Lumber Co., et aL., v. U. S., .upra, note 14.
'T257 U. S. 377, 410-411 (1921).
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direction of a single interpreter of their common purposes
as evidenced in the minute reports of what they had done and
in their expressed purposes as to what they intended to do."
Thereupon followed a number of other prosecutions. The
most prominent being that against the Linseed Oil combina-
tion.' 8 In every case the Supreme Court condemned the scheme
as an artificial means adopted by a combination to circumvent the
Sherman Law. The Supreme Court was vehement in its lan-
guage. Speaking of competition, in the Linseed Oil case, it
said: 19
"The Sherman Act was intended to secure equality of
opportunity and to protect the public against the evils com-
monly incident to monopolies and those abnormal contracts
and combinationi which tend directly to suppress the con-
flict for advantage called competition,-the play of the con-
tending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for
gain."
The decision in the Hardwood Lumber case was rendered
by the Supreme Court in 1921. Since then there have been a
number of changes on the Supreme Court, and Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds and Chief Justice Taft, who at that time voted with
the majority, have now become the minority, and Mr. Justice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, who in the Hardwood Lumber
case were in the minority, have now become members of the
majority.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the Hard-
wood Lumber case, asserted that the agreement merely regulated
business, the very same idea that we now find in the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Stone. Mr. Justice Brandeis has not a
tremendous amount of faith in a competitive system, nor does he
lend himself kindly to any legislation designed to keep a competi-
tive system alive, feeling that good judgment should lead a com-
munity to regulate business, especially big business. That there
may be merit in such a position judging it by economic theory,
U. S. v. American Linseed Oil Co., et al., supra, notes II, 14.
"262 U. S., at page 388.
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there can be no doubt whatever. But many who would sympa-
thize with the idea still would not agree that the so-called regu-
latory measures be left to those who control the industry.
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in the Hardwood Lumber
case on the ground that he always understood that freedom of
speech is a right guaranteed under the Constitution. The trouble
with Mr. Justice Holmes' position is that he evades the whole
question. He recognized no Constitutional difficulty in the Debs
case in declaring that the speeches of Mr. Debs constituted a vio-
lation of law. To test the legality of statements made or state-
ments written are not as simple as those that he suggests in his
dissenting opinion in the Hardwood Lumber case. It all goes
back to the question whether the statements made are of a crim-
inal nature. So whether Mr. Justice Stone's opinion represents
the correct view, or Mr. Justice McReynolds' position repre-
sents the correct view, it is difficult to appreciate the opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes.
If the rule of stare decisis still obtains, then the businczs
community finds itself in this position; on the authority of the
Hardwood Lumber case °20 it is illegal for a combination to dis-
tribute pursuant to agreement among its members, information
regarding prices and production; but on the authority of the
Cement and Maple Flooring cases, it is legal to distribute such in-
formation if a fictitious cost accounting system is also used.
It should not be overlooked that the Sherman Law does not
set forth the contracts and agreements which the Congress
deemed were in restraint of trade. It was the intention of Con-
gress that the statute should be interpreted in the light of Eng-
lish and American cases dealing with such contracts and agree-
ments, thus making judicial legislation inevitable.
2 1
For thirty-five years the Supreme Court has been working
on a body of law with regard to this important statute and after
thirty-five years' labor it is submitted that it has made no progress
in its interpretation. The community is in no better position to-
day to determine which contracts violate the Sherman Law and
"Supra, notes 14, i6.
' U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., supra, note 13.
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which do not, than it was on the second of July, 189o. It is sug-
gested that such a change of position as we find in the Maple
Flooring case should make a Trial Court feel compunction
in imposing jail sentences on defendants convicted of a violation
of the Sherman Law. The business community might fairly have
expected that the courts would define a body of law that it can
follow. Few lawyers would be willing to take the position at the
present time that they can foretell with any degree of certainty
what agreements would be declared violative of the Sherman
Law.
IV
CONCLUSION
It would, perhaps, be unwise to repeal the Sherman Law
until some other method is tested. President Wilson thought
that a Federal Trade Commission would bring, about the desired
result. Experience, however, has demonstrated that it represents
a supine body trying to work wheels that will not turn. It is
hampered from without, it is hampered from within and in addi-
tion is being crushed by its own weight. Business men will not
co-operate with it, because the Federal Trade Commission is with-
out power to grant immunity against criminal prosecution. Busi-
ness men scorn it because at best it can merely issue injunctive
orders. The Commission itself has fettered its effectiveness by
undertaking every complaint that was thrown in its path.
Caution must, therefore, be exercised before adopting the
various proposed remedies contained in recent contributions to
the literature on this subject. In addition, we pause to enquire,
"Does the enactment of the Anti-Trust Laws reflect sincere gov-
ernmental judgment that business should be regulated and
monopolies and combinations destroyed"? Or is it merely a legis-
lative enactment designed to pacify the popular clamor, "Down
with the trusts"?
We question the integrity of governmental conduct which
allows an expenditure of about a half-million dollars to prose-
cute the glass industry and at the same time enacts a Fordney
Tariff to keep Belgium glass out of the home market.
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It would seem that the tariff can strike a serious blow to
trust combinations. When the Tariff Commission learns from
other governmental agencies that an industry is violating the
trust laws, it should, whenever possible, regulate the tariff so as
to bring the industry in competition with foreign markets. No
weapon, it would seem, could be exerted with equal effectiveness.
Yet the sinister activities of trust combinations are pursued by
the Department of Justice on the one hand, and fed with the
bounty of tariff protection on the other.
Besides the potential power of the tariff, what substitute can
be offered for the anti-trust laws? Hesitant in assertion one must
be for the reasons indicated. Ultimately, we prophesy, this
method will be invoked; either the Federal Trade Commission or
a new body will be established with power to regulate the large
industries such as steel, coal and oil. That body will be vested
with power similar to that granted to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. It will regulate these industries in every sense that
the Interstate Commerce Commission now regulates the rail-
roads.
The treatment to be accorded to smaller industries which
still require individual initiative and adventurous undertaking
will largely depend on the sincerity of governmental action. A
sincere governmental attitude will deny the protection of the
tariff to any industry that has by combination agreements de-
stroyed competitive enterprise.
Nathan Probst, Jr.
New York City.
